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The Paranormal, Daubert, Dictionary
Court, and a Futuristic
Courtroom Drama
Judge Joseph P. Baker*
We perceive the world around us through a framework of beliefs
much like glasses we wear on our noses and remain unaware of how
they affect what we see.1 We can easily take off the glasses and ex-
amine the tint and refraction. Self-examination of beliefs comes less
easily, but it will reveal how we color and refract our experiences to fit
our beliefs and do so very noticeably where that involves beliefs in the
paranormal.
A Gallup Poll in 2001 reported half of Americans believed in
psychic or spiritual healing and extrasensory perception (ESP), and a
third believed in haunted houses, demonic possession, ghosts, telepa-
thy, and extraterrestrial beings having visited earth or clairvoyance. 2
National Geographic of November, 2004, devoted its cover story to
evolution and reported a survey finding only twelve percent of Ameri-
cans believed humans evolved from other life forms, while nearly half
believed God created human beings in their present form within the
last 10,000 years.3
If we put those polls in the context of legal proceedings, it gives
a reminder of the famous Scopes "monkey trial" of the 1920s drama-
tized in the play Inherit the Wind.4 In a retrial today or revival of the
play, William Jennings Bryan (Mathew Harrison Brady in the play)
would still express the popular belief denying our ancestry traces back
to slime on a rock by a primeval sea. The conclusion of this article will
* Joseph P. Baker graduated from Swarthmore College in 1959 and the University of
Michigan Law School in 1962. He retired after twenty-five years as a Florida circuit judge
in 2002 and entered the doctoral program in philosophy at the University of South Florida.
Special thanks to professors Patricia Churchland and Susan Haack for taking time from
their own important work to read drafts of my article and give valuable comments. I also
thank USF professors Sidney Axinn and especially Joanne Waugh for her patient guidance
and thoughtful corrections. Responsibility for the final product, however, remains entirely
mine.
1. The simile comes from LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§103, at 45 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3rd ed. 1968).
2. Frank Newport & Maura Strausberg, Americans' Belief in Psychic and Paranormal
Phenomena Is up Over Last Decade, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 2001, at 14.
3. David Quammen, Was Darwin Wrong?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 2002, at 6.
4. JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955).
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consider a sequel of that play dramatizing the consequences of a future
where courts fully embrace science over alternative cosmologies.
The widespread belief in the paranormal reflected in those polls
should come as no surprise. Children, as soon as they can log into a
language, begin to hear stories about ghosts, haunted houses, and
monsters. They receive as gifts android, walking and talking dolls
some with superhuman abilities. Anthropomorphism adds a number
of paranormal featherless bipeds to earth's population as, for example,
a mouse that speaks, reads, writes, dresses in human clothing, dances,
and regularly leads parades. Popular media regularly reinforce belief
in the paranormal, as in television programs portraying psychic detec-
tives using supernatural powers to guide police investigations where
traditional police techniques have failed.
With language, children learn the myths and techniques of
their culture on all sorts of matters. Parents teach children how things
work, which present dangers, which can be fun and how to engage in
activities with others. Most of the shared myths and techniques must
be sound for the society to thrive, but unprovable, paranormal beliefs
do have a role in every culture.
In a legal context this accumulation of learned beliefs usually
goes as "common sense,"5 and the same accumulation is also known as
"folk psychology." An essential axiom of both common sense and folk
psychology maintains human behavior to be intentional.6 For folk psy-
5. For common sense and folk psychology in a legal context, see Ronald J. Allen,
Common Sense, Rationality, and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOzo L. REV. 1417 (2002).
Evidence professor Ron Allen traces the history of "common sense" as it bears on law and
relates that to folk psychology. He discusses the use of common sense and folk psychology
in American jurisprudence and as the foundation for intentionality in legal theory. His
folksy article, drawn from a speech, anticipates many themes presented in my article.
6. For a description of folk psychology and intentional behavior see Murray
Shanahan, Folk Psychology and Naive Physics, in 2 CONNECTIONISM, CONCEPTS, AND FOLK
PSYCHOLOGY: THE LEGACY OF ALAN TuRING 168, 168-173 (1996); Jane Heal, Replication and
Functionalism, in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 45 (Martin Davies & Tony Stone eds., 1995)
(discussing two theories of folk psychology); PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND,
NEUROPHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE MIDDLE-BRAIN 299 (1989); PAUL
CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOusNEss 58-9 (rev. ed. 1988). Patricia Churchland and
her husband would replace folk psychology, if they could, but Patricia Churchland told me
in email correspondence that neurology has not advanced to the stage where it could give a
better explanation of intentional behavior than does folk psychology. She and her husband
discuss folk psychology quite cogently as a shared and learned belief-desire psychology that
makes human behavior intentional and therefore predictable. Patricia Churchland also
assured me that I am "essentially correct" when I interpret "belief' as a term of wide and
imprecise scope in her and her husband's belief-desire psychology. They and I use the term
very imprecisely to include religious beliefs, hopes, fears and so forth. I also include beliefs
in the paranormal to the extent they influence behavior in the same manner as religious
beliefs. Of course, persons differ on what amounts to a belief. You may be offended at what
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chology and common sense, an unquestioned and unquestionable arti-
cle of faith assumes persons act as they do because they intended to act
that way based on their "inner" beliefs. Willie Sutton intended to rob
banks because he believed "that's where the money is." By "inner" we
mean that intentions and beliefs are intangible, not physical parts of
our bodies.
To understand folk psychology, computers provide a handy
analogy. No one who has ever used one can doubt the stupidity of com-
puters. The ontogeny of computers cannot possibly recapitulate bil-
lions of years of phylogeny that led to human brains. Even so,
observing a computer leads to assuming it has an operating language
(binary machine code) that programmers can configure into patterns
(analogous to sentences in ordinary language) giving instructions as to
how the computer reacts to input. We can analogize these patterns or
programs with beliefs by which humans interpret input and make in-
tentional decisions to act.7 Folk psychologists say we learn these be-
liefs at mother's knee and need them to intentionally interact with
other persons.8 Simultaneously, and in the same way, we learn to
make necessary predictions about how other animate and inanimate
things behave. 9
Human civilizations could not exist or perpetuate themselves
without some sort of folk psychology transmissible by language. Oral,
traditional societies successfully preserved themselves and transmit-
I call your belief, for it may be fact to you. Ambrose Bierce defined "scriptures" as "The
sacred books of our holy religion, as distinguished from the false and profane writings on
which all other faiths are based." AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 167 (Laurel
Book 1991) (1911). Such may be said of beliefs generally. A precise definition excluding
ambiguity for "belief' or "folk psychology" cannot be given.
7. See, e.g., JERRY A. FODOR, THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT 65-68, at 55 (paperback ed.
1975) (using the computer analogy to illustrate an "innate" "private language" of thought);
see also, JERRY A. FODOR, THE MIND DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY (paperback ed. 2001)
(discussing Computational Theory of Mind); HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY
4-7 (paperback ed. 1991) (discussing the computer metaphor and Fodor's use of it); PATRICIA
CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 252 (identifying the forces that converged to give "the now-
familiar and virtually doctrinal computer metaphor").
8. See John Heil, Being Indiscrete, in THE FUTURE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY:
INTENTIONALITY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 123 (John D. Greenwood ed., 1991), who compares
folk psychology with "an implicit 'ur-theory,' the roots of which lie in the intentional
vocabulary we learn at our mother's knee." See also PAUL CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 58-
59 (describing folk psychology as a collection of "common-sense generalizations" explaining
how persons behave, and, "All of us learn that framework (at mother's knee, as we learn vur
language), and in doing so we acquire the common-sense conception of what conscious
intelligence is.").
9. This has been called "naive physics," as in Shanahan, supra note 6, at 169, 175-79
(1996). It is also sometimes called "folk physics" or "intuitive physics" to distinguish these
beliefs from folk psychology. PATRICIA CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 290, 300-01.
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ted their various commonly held, everyday beliefs over many genera-
tions before the invention of writing. 10
Clinical studies have shown how children begin at about age
four to be able to predict behavior of other children acting on a false
belief known by the subject child (knower) to be false but not the other
child (false believer).11 Folk psychologists interpret this to show
humans at this age acquire a conceptual scheme, a folk psychology
which allows understanding that others have different mental states
from one's own on which they act intentionally and predictably from
what they believe. This also demonstrates the self-evident fact people
often act on false beliefs as well as sound ones.
American courts and legal professions pride themselves on their
democratic openness and tolerance to where not only jurors but law-
yers and judges come from a wide cross section of society. Legal profes-
sionals and jurors cannot help but bring to court the folk psychology of
their community. Consciously and subconsciously they insinuate com-
mon, everyday beliefs into our legal system, and that necessarily car-
ries with it some popular beliefs in the paranormal contained in folk
psychology.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,12 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, pointedly expressed the Supreme
Court's concern to distinguish the paranormal from admissible science.
He wrote that experts may provide "valid scientific 'knowledge"' 13
about phases of the moon bearing on darkness of a particular night in a
case where that was relevant. He then wrote
However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evi-
dence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the
trier of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually
likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702's "help-
fulness" standard requires a valid scientific connection to the perti-
nent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. 14
Daubert found Federal Rule of Evidence 702 had superseded
the previous standard of "general acceptance" in a scientific field as the
threshold for admissibility of expert testimony announced in Frye v.
10. Daniel Dennett discusses cultural transmission and evolution through language
and what he calls "memes," a word coined because of its similarity to "genes." DANIEL C.
DENNE2rr, DARwIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 335, 344-52
(1995).
11. Martin Davies & Tony Stone, Introduction in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 6 at 1,
2-6.
12. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13. Id. at 591.
14. Id.
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United States.15 To disallow testimony of the paranormal Daubert de-
cided expert witnesses must pass an entrance examination on their
"valid scientific 'knowledge." 16 It gave trial judges the responsibility
of devising and administering these admission tests case by case.'
7
The Chief Justice remarked that in taking over the responsibil-
ity to test scientific evidence with an admissions test, trial judges did
not have "either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists in order to perform [their gatekeeper] role."' Judges would
have cross-examination and other challenges to proffered experts in an
adversarial proceeding, but presumably the underlying framework for
testing evidence lies in the common denominator of common sense and
common, everyday beliefs of the judiciary, that is, in folk psychology.
And why not? Scientists come into the world the same way as
everyone else. They also must have learned an ordinary language and
learned the prevailing everyday beliefs of family and community as
they grew up. We have no less an authority than Albert Einstein that
science arises from and depends on everyday beliefs, that is, on folk
psychology. Einstein wrote:
The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday
thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physi-
cist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of the concepts
of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without considering crit-
ically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the
nature of everyday thinking.19
In his opinion in Daubert, Justice Blackmun cited and discussed
thirty-seven 20 amicus briefs and other secondary sources from the sci-
entific community "markedly different from typical briefs"21 on science
as scientists see it. The acts of submitting and receiving these briefs
amount to a dialogue, a dialogue showing both scientists and legal pro-
fessionals assumed they shared a common language. Dialogue in-
volves mutuality. It involves mutuality of both shared language and
shared beliefs in order to communicate. Daubert implicitly holds judges
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
17. Id. at 592.
18. Id. at 601.
19. ALBERT EINSTEIN, OUT OF My LATER YEARS 59 (1967). See WILLARD VAN ORMAN
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 3 (1960) ("Scientific neologism is itself just linguistic evolution
gone self-conscious, as science is self-conscious common sense."). Wilfred Sellars develops
the same distinction, but he calls it a distinction between the "manifest image" and the
"scientific image." WILFRED SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY 4-40 (1963).
20. 509 U.S. 579 (the Chief Justice giving this number).
21. Id. at 599 (the Chief Justice's phrase).
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should operate within ordinary language and folk psychology under-
stood by those outside of legal professions as well as vice versa.
Scientists, as Justice Blackmun observed, see science as a
method epitomized in the vetting process of publications that requires
review by peer scientists prior to publication and exposes claims of
scientists to unlimited criticism after publication.22 Justice Blackmun
acknowledged that scientists do not claim an "encyclopedic body of
knowledge about the universe," but rather describe science as a "pro-
cess for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the
world that are subject to further testing and refinement."23
After that summary of scientific method, Justice Blackmun
gave the Court's conclusion: "In short, the requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of ev-
identiary reliability."24 The Chief Justice in a separate opinion noted
how Justice Blackmun constructed his argument by parsing the lan-
guage of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to isolate "scien-
tific. . .knowledge" and looking up definitions of those words in a
standard dictionary.
25
"Define your terms." Everyday experience 'teaches the univer-
sal insistence on definitions in argument on any subject. Demand for
definitions has become the first axiom of folk psychological belief about
argument. It has made dictionaries the bible of argument and exposi-
tion, the ultimate authority, the "final court of appeal to which any
disputes about diversity of practice, or 'correctness,' could be re-
ferred."26 Folk belief attributes to dictionaries an omniscience that
smacks of the paranormal.2 7 In accordance with these folk beliefs the
Daubert court looked to dictionaries as a super court whose dictates
even the Supreme Court must follow. Can anyone imagine the Su-
preme Court deciding to overrule dictionaries?
But dictionaries do not offer an unbiased court to follow to sepa-
rate the paranormal from science as attempted in Daubert. Dictionary
definitions come from lexicographers collecting common usages of
22. Id. at 593-94. This view of scientific method I believe to be a fair interpretation of
Justice Blackmun's opinion. I am not ignorant of the controversy and debate over just what
scientific method is, but Justice Blackmun's summary provides a workable formulation of
scientific method.
23. Id. at 590 (italics in the original).
24. Id.
25. Daubert, 509 U.S at 599.
26. Roy HARRIS, THE LANGUAGE-MAKERS 132 (1980).
27. "[The dictionary came to be seen as the repository of verbal meanings par
excellence, regarded with a veneration and respect for authority amounting in certain cases
almost to superstition." Id. at 78.
122
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words. 28 Those definitions can hardly give the user of a dictionary a
transparent glimpse of science, for definitions tint and refract science
through folk beliefs imbedded in ordinary language usage.
29
Though they hold biblical status in folk reasoning, dictionary
definitions provide very unstable grounds for decisions. Modern lan-
guage studies have shown very few terms, if any, of ordinary language
can be defined. 30 Moreover, linguists join other scholars who study
language in unanimously holding words function only within a web or
network of a language. One metaphor suggests we visualize words as
beads on strings that users of a language weave into a fabric of dis-
course. 31 Studies of ordinary communication make it obvious why
"language" does not function as an independent collection of words and
rules of grammar. Communication depends on all aspects of context,
gestures, tone of voice, tacit understanding between interlocutors, and
so on.
3 2
These assertions from linguists and others who study language
easily pass the "smell test" of common experience with ordinary lan-
guage that trial judges all have. They would notice first that defini-
tions obviously change. As science and technology progress, they
modify the framework in which our community understands the world
around it. This changes how persons use words and how dictionaries
define them. Today we could define "water" as "H 20," but that defini-
tion would have baffled Shakespeare. Only a charitable reading of our
forebears allows reading terms from their time as apposite now.33 The
authors who granted power to "regulate Commerce" in the Constitu-
28. Id. at 147. See also WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
24-27 (rev. ed. 1961).
29. As Jacques Derrida wrote, "Now, 'everyday language' is not innocent or
neutral .... [I] t carries with it not only a considerable number of presuppositions of all types,
but also presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which.. .are knotted into a system."
JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 19 (Alan Bass trans., paperback ed. 1982).
30. HARRIS, LANGUAGE-MAKERS, supra note 26, at 127-28; VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD
AND OBJECT, supra note 19. "[M]ost terms cannot be defined - or, at least, cannot be defined
if by a 'definition' one means something that is fixed once and for all, something that
absolutely captures the meaning of the term." HnARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND
REALITY 9 (paperback ed. 1991).
31. IVAN ILLICH & BARRY SANDERS, ABC: THE ALPHABETIZATION OF THE POPULAR MIND
7 (1988).
32. Roy HARRIS, THE LANGUAGE MYTH 55, 155 (1981). This work erases the myth
about language being something separate from the rest of human behavior. Treating it as
separate led to decontextualizing language. When cultures become literate and fix
language with words and spaces on pages this facilitates decontextualizing language and
detaching it from other behavior.
33. PUTNAM, supra note 30, at 13.
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tion 34 could not possibly have contemplated telecommunications,
transportation and global trade that characterize commerce today in
using that phrase.
Everybody who has used dictionaries knows they give defini-
tions of each word with other words. For a definition to capture and fix
any word it defines, a dictionary must define the words of the defini-
tion. The definition then needs definition. This regression goes on and
on and requires a large part of the dictionary if not all of it to define
even the simplest and most common word.35
A famous illustration of the open-ended nature of definitions
asks how to define the word "game."36 "Game" includes activities en-
gaged in by many, a few, two or one. It can include games played to
win or not (peek-a-boo). It can include games for fun or not (gladiato-
rial games, professional sports). "Game" can be used for the prey of a
hunt, as well as a scheme, a plan or a deceit ("Stop playing games with
me"), and courage ("He showed he had a game heart"). Some have used
"game" to describe litigation. We can see that no conceivable definition
could capture any essence common to all of these uses of "game."
The uncertainty of dictionary definitions reveals something
very notable. It does not hinder in the slightest use of the word "game"
in ordinary discourse. The ordinary language, and everyday working
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. HARRIS, THE LANGUAGE MYTH supra note 32, at 169. Jacques Derrida
"deconstructed" dictionaries in a quite simple manner made obscure by his enigmatic style
of writing. Derrida began by accepting Saussure's pioneering work for modern linguistics
that treated language structurally with words as signs and elements of language. Saussure
proposed a model under which each word-sign has two faces, one face that made the word
sensible (visible or audible) and the other face made it intelligible (gave it meaning).
Saussure called these two faces respectively the signifier and the signified. Saussure
illustrated the two faces with the simile of a page. The signifier face of the word lies visible
on one side of the page. The visible signifier has an unseen and unseeable face on the
reverse side of the page, namely, the signified. The invisible signified, the back side of the
sign, gives sensible word-signs meaning by pointing to things. According to Saussure's
linguistic theory, words had to have both faces to function as a medium of communication.
That model demonstrated, Saussure thought, how words could be written down on a page
and refer to things. Ordinary language in this country does not commonly use the word
"signified." The unseen and unseeable face of a word that gives a word meaning by pointing
to or referring to something is popularly called the "concept" behind the word. But, if one
looks in a dictionary to the alphabetical list of signifiers (printed words) in quest of finding
signifieds or concepts behind the visible printed words on the page, the quest will always
prove futile. One can only find signifiers staring back and pointing to other signifiers that
are listed alphabetically elsewhere in the dictionary. The quest for a signified in a
dictionary leads only in a circular and endless pursuit. He has "deconstructed" dictionaries
in a manner similar to Roy Harris. For a reasonably lucid description of this
"deconstruction" see GEOFFREY BENNINGTON & JACQUES DERRIDA, JACQUES DERRIDA 23-42
(Geoffrey Bennington trans., 1993).
36. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 3, at 3, §§ 68-75, at 32-35.
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beliefs we learned at mother's knee, did not require a dictionary. What
suffers is folk psychology's veneration for dictionaries as the super-su-
preme court that brings finality and precision to words and language
in ordinary or professional discourse.
To reach its decision in Daubert, the Supreme Court relied on
common sense and a folk psychological belief in dictionaries, but on
examination this belief proves unsupportable. If courts chose to find a
more stable foundation, they could kick over the traces, and fully em-
brace science. Courts would have no difficulty delimiting and identify-
ing science. Courts could recognize science as Florida A&M University
and every other university in the country do. Universities are not par-
alyzed by indecision in awarding Bachelor of Science degrees because
science cannot be defined in a dictionary. Although some quibbling ex-
ists at the perimeters, outlines of science appear in university curricu-
lums under the rubric "sciences."
37
Scientists and nonscientists recognize as science the work of the
network of professional scientists at universities, researchers in com-
mercial and industrial corporations and nonprofit organizations and
government agencies who rely on and publish in prominent scientific
journals devoted to those university-recognized sciences. 38 The briefs
they submitted in Daubert confess scientists cannot give absolutes, but
they have proven they can deliver the goods better than anyone else as
shown by scientific and technological achievements. The way universi-
ties identify science works for them, works for scientists and nearly
everybody else.
Virtually all of this congeries of scientists believes our universe
began with some sort of cosmic explosion. During many billions of
years, gases congealed into fiery suns, and a few clumps of matter be-
came planets, our rocky earth being one. Almost unanimously, scien-
tists believe that beginning three or four billion years ago and purely
from the interaction of physical matter promoted by energy from the
sun carbon-based molecular structures with a self-replication mecha-
37. Sociologists of science, historians of science, and philosophers of science have
questioned the view of science held by most scientists, but this has not precluded
recognition of science as given here in social and educational institutions and by most
nonscientists. Very few persons would protest at not receiving a Bachelor of Science degree
in English literature or history or business administration or law. Not being considered a
science for degree purposes should not denigrate human sciences and social sciences. Using
.science" in this way comports with common usage acceptable within and without the
community of those with BS degrees, within and without academic communities.
38. The prominence of institutions is probably due to the degree to which science has
become dependent on advanced technology, and only large institutions can afford the
equipment for scientific research.
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nism based on DNA developed on our planet. These structures incor-
porated into cells, followed by multicellular organisms that evolved
into the array of organisms inhabiting the earth today including
humans .39
We can see how unconditional reliance on physical sciences to
the utter exclusion of all paranormal and folk beliefs would reshape
our court in a sequel to Inherit the Wind.40 In the original play, the
trial judge refused to admit testimony from any of a battery of immi-
nent scientists to show the validity of evolution. 41 The sequel could be
set in the not to distant future, and the playwright could assume that
by then every trial and appellate judge would have been thoroughly
schooled in evolution's teaching that humans can claim no essential
difference in mind or spirit from other creatures. Therefore, judges
would reject folk beliefs in anything supernatural - not explainable in
natural, material terms.
A biblical title such as that of the original play would no longer
be appropriate, 42 and the sequel might take the title, "Inherit the
DNA," or, more catchy perhaps, "Man: Monkey and Machine." The se-
quel, rather than focusing on cross-examination of fundamentalist Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan (Brady in the earlier play), would make
neuroscientists the protagonists. Expert neuroscientist witnesses
would testify their science has a scientific explanation that reduces the
law's folk psychology to material, electro-biochemical processes of the
brain. They will say neuroscience has dispensed with our species'
claims to the disembodied, immaterial ideas, thinking, and feelings
that have long been asserted by human beings to define themselves
(Homo sapiens) as distinct from other creatures. These neuroscientists
would testify Scopes could not have had criminal intent that directed
his behavior because neuroscience has accounted for, and reduced, the
law's intent and all other mens rea to terms of brain physiology.43
39. See generally PAUL CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 123 (explaining the evolutionary
background and development of the central nervous system and brain). Scientific
cosmology and evolution is so widely taught in schools and publicized elsewhere citing
further authorities would be superfluous.
40. LAWRENCE & LEE, supra note 4.
41. The judge explained, "The language of the law is clear; we do not need experts to
question the validity of a law that is already on the books." Id., act two, sc. II.
42. "Inherit the Wind" comes from Proverbs 11:29 (King James), "He that troubleth his
own house shall inherit the wind; and the fool shall be servant to the wise of heart."
43. In PATRICIA CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, one reads a comprehensive argument
showing the possibility of such testimony as neuroscience develops to the degree of reducing
and eliminating immaterial mind or spirit to brain physiology. See PAUL CHURcmHLcD,
supra note 6, for a shorter but also comprehensive argument supporting the same reduction
of the immaterial to the material brain.
126
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Some legal scholars dismiss the possibility that neurology could
subsume folk psychology and law as no more than a dream, a fantastic
science fiction.44 Patricia Churchland acknowledges neurological stud-
ies have not yet reached the level that can satisfactorily reduce all con-
sciousness to brain states and processes.45 But, based on the rate of
advance in discoveries about the brain, she believes that likely to come
sooner rather than later.
In the scenario for our future play the courts would necessarily
submit neuroscientist witnesses to a Daubert-style examination before
they accepted the discrediting of folk psychology and completely came
over to science. Expert witnesses would show deep, strongly con-
structed foundations for neuroscience from a long history of careful,
methodical development. It has engaged in continuous testing and vet-
ting through centuries of open scientific debate.
Almost thirty years before the American Revolution, Julien Of-
fray de La Mettrie portrayed humans in purely material and mechani-
cal terms comparing them to a machine.46 After La Mettrie, but still in
the eighteenth century, Franz Joseph Gall did pioneering studies of the
composition and operations of human brains, and even made crude
maps of the brain. Unfortunately for Gall's historical reputation, he
got off on the wrong path in believing the brain affected the shape of
the cranium such that the brain could be read by palpating the skull,
leading to the practice of phrenology.47 (One can speculate whether
eighteenth century courts would have allowed Gall's expert testimony
about an accused after a phrenology examination, but that's another
play.)
Gall had only very simple medical devices, but he collected and
analyzed commonplace events that showed the connection between
head and brain injuries, all motor and sensory faculties, speaking and
thinking capacity, and memory. Gall examined and dissected
whatever brains he could get his hands on from deceased persons and
44. See SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 158 (paperback ed. 1995), arguing Patricia and Paul Churchland have
"subverted" science in a radical and unacceptable way. See also HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE
- WITHIN REASON 154-61 (2003), where Susan Haack explains "The Question of Reduction."
She writes, "Reductionism... is the thesis that the vocabularies of the other sciences, the
social sciences included, can in principle be expressed in terms of the vocabulary of, and
their laws derived from the laws of physics." Id. at 154. While conceding that the brain
plays a large role in human perception and behavior, intention retains a role.
45. PATRICIA CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 277, 326; see also text accompanying note
6.
46. JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE, MAN A MACHINE (Gertrude C. Bussey & M.W.
Calkins trans., Open Court 1912) (1748).
47. PATRICIA CHURCHLAND, supra note 6, at 155-59.
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observe in open head injuries. Scientific vetting separated the wrong
fork from the right one in Gall's work. Following this, correct folk neu-
rologists can now accurately map the brain location areas that control
sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, speech, memory, and other as-
pects of sleep and consciousness. Comparative physiology has shown
modern neurologists how the brains of other creatures work the same
way as human brains, that is, with minute electrical impulses and bio-
chemical interactions, tying all creatures together in the tree of life.
Even with today's technology, much of intentional behavior has
been reduced to algorithms, and neuroscientists would say that with
algorithms computers can do what you can do, and they can do it bet-
ter.48 That applies to playing chess, making bank loans, predictions of
weather, elections, and legal research. Neuroscientist witnesses sim-
ply assert physiological processes of the brain cause all human behav-
ior in a manner analogous to a computer rather than only some
behavior as recognized today.
In this new play, art imitates reality. Courts have recognized
that the brain and its physiological processes control the human ability
to form intentions. Courts have admitted neurological tests showing
lesions and deficiencies of the brain as evidence demonstrating dimin-
ishment of capacity for criminal intent, especially in capital cases. 49
Since we have ample legal precedent recognizing the controlling power
of the brain over behavior, the possibility of reducing legal processes to
brain processes does not come across as quite so wild.
The plot definitely thickens with these neuroscientist wit-
nesses. Since their origins, Western cultures have held that each per-
son carries inside them a "ghost" or what has figuratively been called a
48. See DENNETT, supra note 10, at 60, where Daniel Dennett writes, "This idea, that
all the fruits of evolution can be explained as the products of an algorithmic process, is
Darwin's dangerous idea."
49. E.g., Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2002); Hoskins v. State, 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla.
1997); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital
Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395 (2004) (concentrating on Virginia capital cases). See, e.g.,
M.C. Brower & B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and
Criminal Behavior: A Critical Review, 71.6 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. & PSYCHIATRY 720
(2001) for neurological studies showing the relationship between the brain and criminal
conduct. These minimal citations focus on a narrow section of neurological evidence and fall
within the spectrum of forensic psychiatric and neurological evidence of mental retardation,
insanity and mental illness that bears on criminal mens rea and responsibility. That in
turn falls within the context of expert medical evidence, in the context of medical science, in
the context of medicine, in the context of sciences, human, social and physical. Those lie in
the context of belief systems, which fall within more and more comprehensive contexts. One
must explain all of those contexts to explain their subsystems, but that will not be
attempted in this footnote. See HARRIS, LANGUAGE, supra note 32 and accompanying text;
BENNINGTON & DERRIDA, supra note 35, at 84-98 (expanding "context").
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"homunculus," a little, intangible, paranormal person residing within.
This ghost gets called many names, "soul," "spirit," "psyche," "mind,"
"demon," and so on, but I will use "homunculus" as a catchall. Only
believing in such a paranormal homunculus permits out-of-body exper-
iences and communications with supernatural spirits and spirits of the
dead. 50 The immaterial homunculus does not confine itself to what is
usually called "paranormal," but appears prominently in religion and
everyday folk beliefs, and in court.
Legal professionals have woven our culture's myths, shared by
religion, psychology, and folk psychology, into law where our intentions
dwell in this "inner," immaterial homunculus. As noted before, the
main purpose of folk psychology assumed in law is to explain and jus-
tify intent as controlling behavior. Criminal law depends on intent as a
body-independent mental activity that causes individuals to act. Only
with such a bodiless intent can our law identify criminal acts and mea-
sure intent to determine the degree of culpability. Torts, as compensa-
ble wrongs, have an abstract mental component of intent or neglect.
Contract law depends on intent as a meeting of the homunculi, inde-
pendent of whether, and how, the bodies of contracting parties have
met. American law asserts this homunculus of intent lies within docu-
ments, whispering the message behind the text. Some perceive this ho-
munculus behind the Constitution as bringing forward its "original
intent" and translating it from eighteenth century English usage that
has become archaic.
We have now laid out the conflict that will drive the new play to
a resolution. It will differ from the first play and differ from the Su-
preme Court's resolution of Daubert and the trial court's conclusion of
Mr. Scopes' case. The scenario for our futuristic play will make neuros-
cientist witnesses the protagonists. They will deny that homunculi, or
any other immaterial conceptual creation, have any weight on a bal-
ance scale with evolutionary science. They will undermine the founda-
tions of established legal theory by eliminating from court intent,
beliefs, folk psychology, and reasoning.
In this sequel we have a role reversal. The William Jennings
Bryan part (Mathew Harrison Brady in the 1955 play) becomes the
antagonist and hero to the rescue of common sense, folk beliefs, and
established jurisprudence. The denouement would come when the
nouveau retro Bryan (Brady) cross-examines a neuroscientist. He
would follow the same strategy as Clarence Darrow in Scopes (Henry
50. A very inclusive collection of paranormal accounts, theories and experiences can be
found at http://www.coasttocoastam.com. This is the website of the regular, popular,
nationally broadcast radio program Coast to Coast AM devoted to the paranormal.
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Drummond in Inherit the Wind). He would exploit the paradoxes of
scientific theory in the same way that Darrow (Drummond) had ex-
ploited inconsistencies in Biblical cosmology.
Bryan (Brady) would ask these kinds of questions in cross-ex-
amination. If your science eliminates belief, how can one believe belief
has been eliminated? How can the scientist reason, from accumulated
data about the brain, that reason eliminates reasoning as a meaningful
activity? If natural forces and matter have determined everything
since the original cosmological big bang, doesn't that eliminate all spir-
itual input, human or divine? Doesn't that lead to nihilism? Doesn't
that eliminate even the possibility of a distinction between truth and
falsity? Then, how could a neuroscientist take the oath to tell the truth
in court after admitting the witness cannot tell truth from falsehood?
Your witness, Mr. Darrow!
